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Abstract 
This paper applies the literature on asymmetric price transmission to the emerging commodity market for EU 
emissions allowances (EUA). We utilize an error correction model and an autoregressive distributed lag model to 
measure the relationship between CO2 price changes and the development of wholesale electricity prices. Using 
data from the German market for electricity and EUAs, we find that the rising prices of EUAs have a stronger 
impact on wholesale electricity prices than falling prices -- the first empirical evidence of asymmetric cost pass-
through for these new allowances.  
 
Introduction 
This paper provides the first application of the “rockets and feathers” literature on asymmetric 
cost pass-through to a particular issue, i.e. the relation between CO2-emissions prices and 
electricity wholesale prices. This is an increasingly contentious issue, not only in Europe, 
where the EU implemented a European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) beginning in 
January 2005, but also in the US and in other countries around the world that ponder the 
implementation of a CO2-cap and trade system. In Europe, despite the free allocation of 
allowances (EUAs), economic theory suggests that they be considered opportunity costs in 
electricity prices; thus it is not surprising to find a positive link between EUA and wholesale 
electricity prices. Due to the CO2 intensity of different electricity production technologies, the 
influence of EUA prices on power prices is nonlinear.1 Using data for 2005, Sijm et al. (2006) 
estimated that emissions costs have been almost fully (60-100%) passed through to 
consumers. Power consumers soon complained about excessive increases in the price of 
electricity. One of their objections was based on anecdotal evidence that wholesale electricity 
prices occasionally reacted more to EUA price increases than to decreases. For example, a 
60% drop in EUA prices in the last week of April 2006 was only met by an 8% decline in 
power prices (EEX 2007 Futures).  
Studies of asymmetric pricing in various industries (e.g., Peltzmann, 2000)2 have indeed 
found evidence for positive asymmetric pricing, i.e. positive cost shocks are disseminated 
                                                     
1 The emergence of CO2 as a cost factor of electricity prices complicates the analysis of the competitive supply 
curve (“merit order”). Fuels vary in emissions, e.g. nuclear (0 t/MWh), natural gas (0.48t/MWh) and coal 
(0.85t/MWh). Therefore, peak electricity prices (generally determined by a marginal, CCGT plant) are likely to be 
less affected by CO2 prices than mid-load electricity prices (generally coal). 
2 The literature of energy economics has intensively investigated the asymmetric link between crude oil and 
gasoline prices. See Geweke (2004), Manera and Frey (2005) and Kaufmann and Laskowski (2005) for a survey of 
the literature on asymmetric gasoline pricing. Other industrial and agricultural products as well as services 
(banking) feature the same phenomenon. 
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 more strongly and/or quickly to the final prices than negative cost shocks. Explanations point 
to either the exercise of market power and/or industry-specific factors.3 This paper applies an 
error correction and an autoregressive distributed lag model to identify asymmetric cost pass-
through in the relationship between EUA and wholesale electricity prices. We reject the 
hypothesis of symmetric cost pass-through, in favor of asymmetric pricing. We hope that this 
paper will stimulate a discussion of empirical evidence and theoretical explanations of this 
phenomenon. 
Section 2 introduces the data; Section 3 describes the tests for asymmetric pricing and 
presents the results; and Section 4 concludes. 
 
Data 
In 2005 a total of 350 million tonnes of CO2 (~€9 billion) were traded at the European 
Climate Exchange (London), various European electricity exchanges and over-the-counter 
(OTC). We are mainly interested in the German market, and will therefore use the data 
provided by the European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig. We chose to use data for the 
EUA spot market. We also obtained spot market electricity prices as well as prices for 
electricity futures with delivery in 2007 from the EEX for the entire sample period (workdays 
of 2005-2006).4
Figure 1: Electricity Future Prices in €/MWh and EUA Spot Price in €/t in 2005-06 
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The EEX EUA spot prices as well as EEX electricity futures prices for the years 2005-2006 
are depicted in Figure 1. The most outstanding event - the price crash in spring 20065 - is 
highlighted by a vertical line. Electricity futures and electricity spot prices differ significantly 
in almost all statistical measures (e.g. mean, variance). The higher volatility of electricity spot 
prices is due to the fact that they are based on more information (e.g. weather, demand, and 
power plant availability) and that electricity future prices capture a longer delivery period, 
smoothing the effects on individual demand and supply shocks. Since hourly demand and 
supply factors are less important for the price formation in electricity futures markets, the 
main price drivers are fuel and EUA prices. This is illustrated by the significantly higher 
correlation of EUA price changes with electricity futures than with electricity spot price 
changes. Daily EUA price changes feature no significant correlation with spot electricity price 
                                                     
3 Borenstein et al. (1997) for example suggest three explanations for their finding of short-run asymmetric pricing 
in the gasoline market: (1) a model of tacit collusion with imperfect monitoring, (2) a model with finite inventories 
and (3) a model of consumer search cost. Balke et al. (1998) considers signalling in tacit collusion and accounting 
methods such as “first-in-first-out” as explanation for asymmetric pricing. Asymmetric menu cost could also 
induce asymmetric pricing (Meyer and v.C-Taubadel, 2004). 
4 Prices at the EEX are often considered as reference and usually track the more liquid OTC prices sufficiently 
well. 
5 In the end of April 2006 information leaked to the traders that some countries (Netherlands, Czech Republic, 
Walloon, Spain, France) emitted significantly less CO2 than expected which created an overall long position in the 
market causing EUA prices to drop from around €30 to €10. For more details see CEAG (2006). 
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 changes but a correlation coefficient of .72 with base electricity future 2007 price changes. 
Due to this structure, we limit our analysis to the EEX electricity futures prices.6
 
Methodology and Results 
Error Correction Model 
Following Borenstein et al. (1997) the  asymmetric diffusion pattern of positive and negative 
cost shocks can be estimated using Error Correction Models (ECM). These models assume a 
long run (symmetric) relation between prices and cost: 
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 but allow for short run systematic deviations: 
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where  is the electricity price,  the EUA price, tEEX tCO2 tEEXΔ  the period to period 
electricity price change,  the positive period to period EUA price change (or zero if 
),  the considered exogenous variables like fuel prices or demand, and 
+Δ tCO2
02 <Δ tCO tX tε  the 
iid estimation error. To reduce the number of variables (and because of a lack of significance) 
the asymmetric reaction to past electricity prices suggested by Borenstein et al. (1997) are 
deleted. The response in time  to a one-time, 1%-positive COkt + 2 price shock in t  is given 
by 
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Because of the limited sample length (2 years), only a few specific combinations of lag length 
and data-frequency can be reasonably considered. Thus, we estimate (2) separately for weekly 
average base and peak futures prices using four lags in both cases. To control for gas price 
developments, we included Dutch TTF gas spot prices since no comparably liquid 
corresponding German market exists.8  
 
6 The hypothesis that the correlation coefficient is not different from zero is rejected with 99% confidence. 
7 Note, that the long run symmetry condition (1) implies ( )−+
∞→
= kkk BBlim
. 
8 Since including time trend, constant, coal prices or load as well as controlling for the market crash in April 2006 
does not alter the asymmetry results significantly, we only present the results for the most parsimonious 
specification. Detailed results might be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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 Table 1: Error Correction Model Results 
Variable Base Peak 
R2 ( 2R ) 74% (69%) 63% (54%) 
2σ  0.48 0.86 
Durbin-Watson 1.92 1.94 
Engels ARCH (CV 5%=3.84) 3.17 2.05 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (CV 5%=0.13) 0.09  0.08 
Constant 1.33  1.17  
Time trend 0.02 ** 0.03 ** 
dCO2+t 0.14 0.09  
dCO2+t-1 0.15 0.07  
dCO2+t-2 -0.17 -0.29 * 
dCO2+t-3 0.49 *** 0.70 *** 
dCO2-t  0.02 0.05  
dCO2-t-1 -0.17 * -0.19 *** 
dCO2-t-2 0.17 * 0.11  
dCO2-t-3 0.52 *** 0.42 *** 
dEEXt-1 -0.01  0.04  
dEEXt-2 -0.04  -0.09  
dEEXt-3 0.10  0.16  
dGASt -0.03  -0.03  
dGASt-1 0.00  0.01  
dGASt-2 0.02  0.02  
dGASt-3 0.06 ** 0.08 ** 
EEXt -0.09 ** -0.07 ** 
CO2t 0.04 *** 0.04 ** 
GASt 0.05 * 0.07 * 
F(H0: CO2sym vs. H1: CO2asym)9 2.9 ** 1.9  
*,**,*** coefficient different from zero on the 10%, 5%, 1% confidence interval, 
respectively. Weekly average 2005-2006 data (99 observations). 
 
The R2 above 60% and the Durbin-Watson statistic of almost 2 indicate that the model is 
reasonably well specified.10 In the base and the peak cases, we find the typical characteristic 
of positive asymmetric cost pass-through: while in the first two weeks, positive EUA price 
shocks had a stronger positive influence on EEX prices, negative shocks (i.e. EUA price 
decreases) catch up in the third and fourth weeks (  and ). The B−+ > tt ββ ˆˆ −−+− < 11 ˆˆ tt ββ + and B- 
values calculated according to (3) confirm the quicker pass-through of positive EUA price 
shocks to electricity future prices (see Figure 3). While the null hypothesis of symmetric cost 
pass-through cannot be rejected for the peak case, it can be rejected on the 5% confidence 
level for base case. The latter is evidence for positive asymmetric cost pass-through. 
One additional finding merits notice: The last lag of the asymmetric coefficient is in all cases 
high (~0.5) and highly significant while most other lags are not. This indicates that the 
imposed error correction forces the model back to the equilibrium in the last period. Although 
                                                     
9 The residual tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test cannot reject normality and Engels ARCH test can reject 
conditional heteroscedasticity) allow using the standard F-Test. 
10 Note that including coal prices and electricity demand as explanatory variables did not prove significant. The 
residual tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test cannot reject normality and Engels ARCH test can reject conditional 
heteroscedasticity) allow using the standard F-Test. 
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 it may be possible to detect additional dynamics by including more lags, this is infeasible 
because the ratio of variables over observations is already critical.11  
 
Figure 2: Impact of EUA price changes on electricity price changes estimated using an ECM and 
data from the German electricity and emissions markets 2005-2007 
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Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model  
One way to circumvent the difficulties of the ECM model is to drop the error correction term 
and thus deviate from the idea of a long-run equilibrium. By doing so, the forced upward 
trend in the last lag and the number of estimated coefficients can be greatly reduced.12 
Following Karrenbrock (1991) our autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model is: 
( ) ( ) tp
i
iti
n
i
itiitit XCOCOtEEX εγββφφ +Δ+Δ+Δ++=Δ ∑∑
=
−
=
−
−
−+
−
+
00
10 22  
 (4) 
In (4), we can test the hull hypothesis of symmetric cost pass-through against the alternative 
hypothesis of asymmetric cost pass-through by finding whether for all . −+ = ii ββ i
                                                     
11 The number of variables equal ( ) , where33 +×+ nx x  is the number of exogenous variables and n  is the number of 
lags. This is critical since the data sample consists of only two years and correspondingly only 104- n  weekly 
observations are available. 
12 Note that Geweke (2004) criticizes (4) since it implies the gap between prices and cost will grow indefinitely in 
the long-run. In our case, however, this argument does not hold because the length of our sample does not allow 
the prices to return sufficiently often to the long-run equilibrium. 
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 Table 2: Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model Results 
Variable Base Peak 
R2 ( 2R ) 71% (67%) 52% (46%) 
2σ  0.5 1 
Durbin-Watson 1.47 1.33 
Engels ARCHstat (CV 5%=3.84) 2.61 0.10 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (CV 5%=0.13) 0.07 0.09 
dCO2+t
0.18 * 0.18  
dCO2+t-1
0.13  -0.01  
dCO2+t-2
-0.09  -0.14  
dCO2+t-3
0.52 *** 0.76 *** 
dCO2-t  
-0.04  0.03  
dCO2-t-1
-0.19 *** -0.23 ** 
dCO2-t-2
0.22 *** 0.17 * 
dCO2-t-3
0.51 *** 0.38 *** 
∑ +2dCO  0.74  0.79  
∑ −2dCO  0.50  0.35  
dGASt
-0.01  0.00  
dGASt-1
0.03  0.04  
dGASt-2
0.01  0.01  
dGASt-3
0.04 * 0.06 * 
F(H0: CO2sym vs. H1: CO2asym) 13 4.1 *** 3.4 ** 
*,**,*** coefficient different from zero on the 10%, 5%, 1% confidence interval, respectively. 
Weekly average 2005-2006 data (99 observations). 
 
Therefore, we estimate (4) using a specification comparable to the presented ECM model. 
The ADL model results indicate a slightly inferior “fit” compared to the EC model in terms of 
adjusted R2 and Durbin-Watson statistics. Nevertheless, the results in Table 2 provide strong 
evidence for positive asymmetric cost pass-through of EUA prices: The cumulated sums of 
the lagged coefficients for positive EUA price changes in both cases are larger than those for 
negative ones (see Figure 3). Further, the hypothesis of EUA symmetric cost pass-through to 
electricity futures prices is rejected in favor of the asymmetric version on the 5% confidence 
level. Moreover, assuming asymmetric gas price pass-through does not prove significant in 
general. This is evidence that asymmetric pricing is not a universal phenomenon in electricity 
futures markets but is specific to the EUA price pass-through. 
 
                                                     
13 The residual tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test cannot reject normality and Engels ARCH test can reject 
conditional heteroscedasticity) allow using the standard F-Test. 
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 Figure 3: Cost Pass-Through of EUAs in Future 2007 Prices 2005-2006 
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Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed asymmetric cost pass-through between EUA and electricity future 
prices in Germany. We applied an error correction and an autoregressive distributed lag 
model to analyze this link. We find convincing evidence that emissions prices are passed 
through asymmetrically to electricity futures prices in Germany. 
We observe that since most industry-specific explanations for asymmetric pricing (search 
cost, inventories, menu cost, signaling, and the like) do not apply for electricity wholesale 
electricity markets, two intuitive explanations arise, although neither is fully convincing: 
First, asymmetric cost pass-through may be a sign of an early market phase, where the 
knowledge about how to handle a newly introduced cost factor develops over time. Second, 
finding evidence of asymmetric pricing could indicate the exercise of market power by 
German electricity generators. 
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 Appendix  
Figure 4: Residual Tests 
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